We introduce a measure of fairness for algorithms and data with regard to multiple protected attributes. Our proposed definition, differential fairness, is informed by the framework of intersectionality, which analyzes how interlocking systems of power and oppression affect individuals along overlapping dimensions including race, gender, sexual orientation, class, and disability. We show that our criterion behaves sensibly for any subset of the set of protected attributes, and we illustrate links to differential privacy. A case study on census data demonstrates the utility of our approach.
Algorithmic Fairness and its Relation to Intersectionality
Fairness is a complicated socio-technical construct with a multitude of political and legal facets, which may be in conflict with each other and with the original goals of the algorithm such as predictive accuracy [4] . Part of the challenge is that protected attributes such as gender or race, for which we'd like to prevent bias, do not exist in isolation, but in the context of other observed and latent attributes, and each of these may be correlated with each other and with the outputs of the system. Even when the use of protected attributes is disallowed, other correlated proxy variables may exist which will lead a classifier to unintentionally discriminate. For example, zip codes are highly correlated with race [21] . On the other hand, attributes which are important for the algorithm may have different distributions depending on the protected attributes; a phenomenon known as infra-marginality [32] . Consequently, equity may not always correspond to fairness, as defined by [34] .
It is also important to connect fairness and bias in algorithms to the broader context of fairness and bias in society, which has long been the concern of civil rights and feminist scholars and activists [29] . Of particular relevance is the principle of intersectionality from the third-wave feminist movement [13] . Intersectional feminist scholars have noted that systems of oppression built into society lead to systematic disadvantages along intersecting dimensions, which include not only gender, but also race, nationality, sexual orientation, disability status, and socioeconomic class [11, 10, 13, 20, 27, 35] .
While the infra-marginality principle states that differences in the distributions of the "merit" or "risk" (e.g. the probability of carrying contraband at a policy stop) of individuals from protected groups should be taken into account, intersectionality theory provides a counterpoint: these differences, while acknowledged, are frequently due to systemic structural disadvantages such as racism, sexism, inter-generational poverty, the school-to-prison pipeline, and the prison-industrial complex [11, 13, 20, 36, 14, 37] . Systems of oppression can lead individuals to perform below their potential, for instance by reducing available cognitive bandwidth [36] , or by increasing the probability of incarceration [37, 14] . These systems are interlocking in their effect on individuals at the intersection of multiple protected categories [11, 13] . Distributions of merit and risk are hence influenced by unfair societal processes. Even fairness definitions that specifically model the merit or risk properties of individuals through latent variables [32] or causal modeling [26] can thus appear unfair when viewed through the lens of intersectionality, if they do not take into account the structural factors which systematically affect these properties.
From an intersectional perspective, in many fairness contexts, algorithms should be designed to counteract the effects of these systems of oppression. In some cases, this may be at the expense of predictive accuracy [4] . However, we must be careful to distinguish between the statistical problem of classification, and the economic problem of the assignment of outcomes to individuals based on classification. Intersectionality is concerned with the latter, which has real personal and economic consequences [28] , and may reasonably be accomplished at some expense to the former. Note that the determination of whether, in a given context, fairness should accommodate differences between protected groups, or counteract them, may involve a political judgment. In summary, we argue that an intersectional definition of fairness for algorithms should have the following properties:
• Multiple protected attributes should be considered simultaneously.
• All of the intersecting values of the protected attributes, e.g. black women, should be protected under the definition. At the same time, we should ensure that the individual protected attributes are protected overall, e.g. women are protected.
• The definition should aim to ensure that systematic differences in the behavior of the algorithm, due to structural oppression, are rectified, rather than codified.
In the next section, we propose such a definition.
Differential Fairness
We consider the task of assigning outcomes to individuals, e.g. making lending decisions for loan applicants, which in a machine learning context is typically accomplished by a classification algorithm. The goal is to accomplish this while preventing discriminatory (or other) bias with respect to a set of protected attributes, such as gender, race, and disability status. Specifically, according to our intersectional fairness criteria stated above, we aim to ensure that the individuals at each intersecting value of the protected attributes, e.g. white, male, and physically disabled, will on average be treated similarly by the algorithm. In many cases, the user of the classifications (the vendor), who is often not the data owner, may also be untrusted, and should not access the input data [15] . We address this by defining a fairness criterion which ensures that the classifications are not informative of the intersection of the protected attributes. Suppose M(x) is a (possibly randomized) mechanism which takes an instance x and produces an outcome y for the corresponding individual, S 1 , . . . , S p are discrete-valued protected attributes, A = S 1 × S 2 × . . . × S p , and Θ is a set of distributions θ which could plausibly generate each instance x. 1 (Alternatively, Θ is the set of possible beliefs that the vendor or an adversary may have about the data.) For example, the mechanism M(x) could be a deep learning model for a lending decision, A could be the applicant's possible gender and race, and Θ could be the set of Gaussian distributions over credit scores per value of the protected attributes, with mean and standard deviation within a certain range. The protected attributes are included in the attribute vector x, although M(x) is free to disregard them. See Figure 1 for a diagram of the setting.
Our proposed criterion, differential fairness (DF), is a measurement of the degree of (un)fairness of the mechanism. It applies at the population level, but a specific individual i may still be unlikely to, e.g., be offered a loan, based on their data x i . Differential fairness measures the fairness cost of M(x) with a parameter : Definition 3.1. A mechanism M(x) is -differentially fair (DF) in a framework (A, Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with x ∼ θ, and y ∈ Range(M),
for all (s i , s j ) ∈ A × A where P(s i |θ) > 0, P(s j |θ) > 0.
In Definition 3.1, s i , s j ∈ A are tuples of all protected attribute values, e.g. gender, race, and nationality. This is an intuitive intersectional definition of fairness: regardless of the combination of protected attributes, the probabilities of the outcomes will be similar, as measured by the ratios versus other possible values of those variables, for small values of . For example, the probability of being given a loan would be similar regardless of a protected group's intersecting combination of gender, race, and nationality, marginalizing over the remaining attributes in x. If the probabilities are always equal, then = 0.
To evaluate the differential fairness of a mechanism in practice, we must have access to a class of plausible distributions Θ over the data x (which could be a single point estimate Θ = {θ}). 2 This can be accomplished by training a Bayesian probabilistic model on an observed dataset, and setting Θ to be either a MAP estimate, a set of burned-in MCMC samples, the posterior predictive distribution, or a credible region. Alternatively, we can simply plug in the empirical data distribution, in which case we refer to the criterion as empirical differential fairness (EDF).
We provide illustrative worked examples for calculating (empirical) differential fairness in Section 5, and a case study in Section 6. First, we derive several useful properties of differential fairness, which motivate its use as a measurement tool for fairness in an intersectional context. 2 In the definition, the use of a class of distributions Θ, instead of a single distribution θ, allows for uncertainty in the data distribution. In the privacy interpretation of differential fairness (Section 3.2), it enables privacy when the vendor or an adversary's beliefs may take a range of values, cf. pufferfish [24] . Also note that we abuse notation slightly, using θ and Θ to refer either to distributions, or to model parameters encoding those distributions.
Differential Fairness and Intersectionality
In the intersectional setting, where A contains multiple protected attributes, differential fairness implies fairness with respect to each of the protected attributes individually:
Proof. Let θ ∈ Θ. Then for any outcome y, and (s i , s j ) ∈ S 1 × S 1 where P(s i |θ) > 0 and P(s j |θ) > 0, let a be any value of S 2 where P(S 2 = a, S 1 = s i |θ) > 0. (Such an a must exist, since P(s i |θ) = ∑ s 2 ∈S 2 P(S 2 = s 2 , s i |θ) > 0.) Then we have:
Reversing s i and s j and taking the reciprocal shows the other inequality. Note that in showing the last inequality, we must be careful to consider the case where P M,θ (s 2 , s i |θ) = 0, in which case the ratio in the numerator is not bounded by e . However, the term drops out as P θ (s 2 |s i , θ) = 0 follows from the assumption that P(s i |θ) > 0. A similar argument applies for the case where P M,θ (s 2 , s j |θ) = 0.
Proof. Treat A \ S k as one "super-variable" and apply the previous argument.
Corollary 3.2. M is 2 -differentially fair in any nonempty proper subset of the protected attributes.
For example, if a loan approval mechanism M(x) is -DF in A = Gender × Race × Nationality, it is 2 -DF in, e.g., Gender by itself, or Gender × Nationality. In other words, by ensuring fairness at the intersection of gender, race, and nationality under our criterion, we also ensure a similar degree of fairness between genders overall, and between gender/nationality pairs overall, and so on. Note that in the above, 2 is a worst case, and DF may also hold for lower values of . We provide a more mathematically precise statement of Corollary 3.2, and its proof, below. 
. . × S p as the Cartesian product of the protected attributes included in A but not in D. Let θ ∈ Θ. Then for any outcome y, and (s i , s j ) ∈ D × D where P(s i |θ) > 0 and P(s j |θ) > 0, let q be any value of E where P(q, s i |θ) > 0. (Such a q must exist, since P(s i |θ) = ∑ e∈E P(E = e, s i |θ) > 0.) We have:
Relationship to Simpson's Paradox: Simpson's reversal occurs when the sign of the association between two variables reverses when conditioning on a third, for all (or most) of the third variable's values [30] . This can be counter-intuitive, leading to it being termed a "paradox." For example, a university could admit men at a higher rate than women overall, yet admit women at a higher rate than men for each race of applicants. Thus, the direction of discriminatory bias in admissions "paradoxically" depends on the granularity of measurement. In the fictional scenario shown in Section 5.1 (based on real data, but for kidney stone treatment rather than college admissions), for instance, women (Gender A) were admitted 78% of the time, while men (Gender B) were admitted 83% of the time. Yet, women from Race 1 were admitted 93% of the time, versus 87% for men, and women from Race 2 were admitted 73% of the time, versus 69% for men.
On the other hand, Theorem 3.1 implies, roughly speaking, that if the university is the most inequitable in its admissions with respect to, e.g., black men, versus other groups, it cannot be inequitable to a substantially higher degree against men overall, or against women overall. Ensuring that a satisfactory degree of differential fairness is obtained in the intersectional case (where we aim to protect the intersection of gender and race), thereby ensures that a similarly satisfactory degree of differential fairness is obtained in the non-intersectional case (where we aim to protect gender alone, or race alone), even in the situation of a Simpson's reversal.
Bayesian Privacy Interpretation
The differential fairness definition, and the resulting level of fairness obtained at any particular measured fairness parameter , can be interpreted by viewing the definition through the lens of privacy. Differential fairness ensures that given the outcome, an untrusted vendor/adversary can learn very little about the protected attributes of the individual, relative to their prior beliefs, assuming their prior beliefs are in Θ:
E.g., if a loan is given to an individual, the vendor or adversary's Bayesian posterior beliefs about their race and gender will not be substantially changed [24, 33] . Thus, an adversary will not be able to make an inference such as "this individual was given a loan, so they are probably white and male." Our definition can thus provide fairness guarantees when the user of M(x) is untrusted, cf. [15] . This can prevent subsequent discrimination, e.g. in retaliation to any fairness-preserving correction that was applied to the algorithm. Also note that although differential fairness is a population-level definition, it provides a privacy guarantee for individuals. The privacy property in Equation 4 suggests a close connection to algorithmic privacy definitions, such as differential privacy [16] . Indeed, differential privacy and our differential fairness definition are both instances of pufferfish, a general privacy framework [24, 33] . However, differentially fair mechanisms are applied to one individual at a time and must hide the individual's protected attributes, while differentially private mechanisms are applied to the entire dataset at a time and must hide the presence of any one individual's data. Also note that differential privacy is typically enforced for the computation of each step of the learning algorithm, while differential fairness pertains to the behavior of the final model.
Although we are applying a privacy-style definition to algorithmic fairness, the goals and the methods to achieve them are quite different, as we want to de-bias the mechanism, rather than obfuscate it with noise. To enforce differential privacy, the standard approach is to add random noise to the output of the mechanism, frequently from the Laplace distribution [16] . While adding Laplace noise could be used to obtain differential fairness, we do not in general recommend this approach, as it would likely obscure much of the useful information in the data. In contrast, to enforce differential fairness, we would generally alter the mechanism, e.g. by changing the weight parameters of a neural network appropriately. Note that unlike differential privacy as well as individual fairness [15] , we can achieve differential fairness using a mechanism M(x) which is deterministic, since the randomness in the data is considered in the calculation of the parameter . Thus, there is generally no need to inject noise into the mechanism.
Interpreting
We can understand the extent to which an -differentially fair mechanism is fair, for a particular value of , by way of its corresponding privacy guarantee, which is measured on the same scale as that of differential privacy. In particular, the level of privacy provided by -differential privacy (and hence, differential fairness) can be interpreted through a corresponding economic guarantee. In the case of differential privacy, if the user contributes their data, their expected utility due to the outcome of the mechanism will be harmed by at most a factor of exp( ) ≈ 1 + (for small values of ) [17] . This holds regardless of their utility function. The privacy guarantee is generally considered to be strong if < 1 (or so), in which case the mechanism is often described as being in the high-privacy regime. If is substantially greater than 1, for example = 20, the privacy guarantee is understood to be almost meaningless.
As an example to calibrate intuitions regarding , consider the randomized response procedure, which is often used in the design of surveys with sensitive questions. A participant is asked to flip an unbiased coin, and answer a yes/no question truthfully if the coin comes up heads. Otherwise, the participant flips the coin again, and answers randomly according to the coin flip. Randomized response is = ln(3) ≈ 1.0986-differentially private [17] , which is slightly above the "high privacy" cut-off point at around = 1.
In our case, an -differentially fair mechanism admits a disparity in expected utility of as much as a factor of exp( ) between pairs of protected groups with s i ∈ A, s j ∈ A, for any utility function that could be chosen. For example, consider a loan approval process, where the utility of being given a loan is 1, and being denied is 0. Suppose the approval process is ln(3)-differentially fair, i.e. the same value of as randomized response in terms of the strength of the corresponding privacy guarantee. The approval process could then be three times as likely to award a loan to white men as to white women, and thus award white men three times the expected utility as white women. The proof follows the case of differential privacy [17] . Let u(y) : Range(M(x)) → R ≥0 be a utility function. Then we have:
Measuring Bias in Data
We can extend differential fairness to measure the intrinsic bias in a dataset (as opposed to an algorithm). This allows us to quantify bias in non-algorithmic (or black box) processes, e.g. stop-and-frisk policing interactions [32] . Intersectionality theory asserts that the labels in our data, which correspond to outcomes assigned to individuals, may be systematically biased, due to societal structures of oppression, including racism, sexism, and the prison-industrial complex [14] . Our goal is to measure this bias. Suppose we observe a dataset of N individuals with features x, including protected attributes A, who are assigned outcomes y. We deconstruct the distribution of the data as P(x, y) = P(x)P(y|x), and use these factors to specify the elements of the differential fairness definition, as M(x) = y ∼ P(y|x), and Θ = {P(x)}. We again consider model-based and empirical definitions. y 1 ) , . . . , (x N , y N )} is -differentially fair (DF) in A with respect to model P Model (x, y) if mechanism M(x) = y ∼ P Model (y|x) is -differentially fair in framework (A, {P Model (x)}), for P Model trained on the dataset.
Definition 4.2.
A labeled dataset {(x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x N , y N )} with corresponding empirical distribution P Data (x, y) is -empirically differentially fair (EDF) in A if mechanism M(x) = y ∼ P Data (y|x) is -differentially fair in framework (A, {P Data (x)}).
Assuming discrete outcomes, P Data (y|s) = 
whenever N s i > 0 and N s i > 0. In practice, we may wish to apply a Dirichlet prior for smoothing. Using Definition 4.1 with the model P Model (y|s) chosen to be the posterior predictive distribution of a Dirichlet-multinomial model for outcomes given protected attributes s, the criterion for any y, s i , s j becomes
where scalar α is each entry of the parameter of a symmetric Dirichlet prior with concentration parameter |Y |α, Y = Range(M). More complex models are expected to be useful when the protected attributes are high dimensional, which leads to data sparsity in N y,s .
Measuring Bias Amplification
Similarly to differential privacy, non-negative differences 2 − 1 between two mechanisms M 1 (x) and M 2 (x) are meaningful (for fixed A and Θ, and for tightly computed minimum values of ), and measure the additional "privacy cost" of using one mechanism instead of the other, when interpreting differential fairness as a privacy definition. From an economic perspective, M 2 (x) admits at most an exp( 2 − 1 ) ≈ 1 + 2 − 1 (for small values of 2 − 1 ) multiplicative increase in the disparity of expected utility between pairs of protected intersections of groups with s i ∈ A, s j ∈ A, relative to M 1 (x). When 1 is the (empirical) differential fairness of a labeled dataset and 2 is the (empirical) differential fairness of a classifier trained on the dataset, 2 − 1 is a measure of the extent to which the classifier increases the unfairness over the original data, a phenomenon that [38] refer to as bias amplification.
Illustrative Worked Examples
A simple worked example of differential fairness is given in Figure 2 . In the example, given an applicant's score x on a standardized test, the mechanism M(x) = x ≥ t approves the hiring of a job applicant if their test score x ≥ t, with t = 10.5. The scores are distributed according to θ, which corresponds to the following process. The applicants protected group is 1 or 2 with probability 0.5. Test scores for group 1 are normally distributed N(x; µ 1 = 10, σ = 1), and for group 2 are distributed N(x; µ 2 = 12, σ = 1). In the figure, the group-conditional densities are plotted on the top, along with the threshold for the hiring outcome being yes (i.e. M(x) = 1). Shaded areas indicate the probability of a yes hiring decision for each group (overlap in purple). On the bottom, the calculations show that M(x) is -differentially fair for = 2.337. This means that the probability ratios are bounded within the range (e − , e ) = (0.0966, 10.35), i.e. one group has around 10 times the probability of some particular hiring outcome than the other (y = no). Under the presumption that the two groups are roughly equally capable of performing the job overall, this is clearly unsatisfactory in terms of fairness.
Intersectional Example: Simpson's Paradox
The intersectional setting, in which there are multiple protected variables, is specifically addressed by differential fairness, by considering the probabilities of outcomes for each intersection of the set of protected variables. We illustrate this setting with an example that is commonly used to demonstrate Simpson's paradox [9, 22] . Our example is adapted from a real-world scenario which considers the success probabilities of two treatments for kidney stones (treatments A and B), depending on whether the kidney stones are large or small. Counter-intuitively, treatment A is more effective for small stones, and also for large stones, yet treatment B is more effective overall when the results for both stone sizes are aggregated. This apparently paradoxical result is explained by an unobserved confounding factor, the severity of the case, which affects the doctors' decision on which treatment to use, with the more powerful and effective treatment, treatment B, typically being favored in more severe cases only [22] . We adapt the data from the kidney stone example to an analogous fairness scenario in which treatment success is replaced by a favored outcome, admission of a prospective student to University X, and treatment and stone size are replaced by protected attributes, gender and race, respectively ( Table 1 ). The mechanism in this case is the admissions process, a black box which we model empirically based on count data via Definition 4.2 and Equation 6. In our adapted scenario, Simpson's "paradox" occurs because the direction of "unfairness" with regard to Gender depends on whether Race is also measured: individuals of Gender A are Table 2 : Empirical differential fairness of the Adult dataset. more likely to be admitted than those of Gender B for both races, but Gender B is more likely to be admitted overall.
By calculating the log probability ratios of (Gender, Race) pairs from Table 1 , as well as for the pairs of probabilities for the declined admission outcome (1 − P(admit)), and plugging them into Equation 6 , we can readily find that the mechanism is = 1.511-EDF with A = Gender × Race. Theorem 3.1 shows that the mechanism is at most 2 = 3.022-EDF for A = Gender and for A = Race. Thus, even with the occurrence of a Simpson's reversal the level of differential (un)fairness may not substantially increase after aggregating. Indeed, by calculating using the admission probabilities in the Overall row (Gender) and the Overall column (Race), we find that = 0.2329 for A = Gender, and = 0.8667 for A = Race.
As we have seen, differential fairness can be used to measure the inequity between the outcome probabilities for the protected groups and their intersections at different levels of measurement granularity, although it does not determine whether the inequities were due to systemic factors and/or discrimination. In this case, analogously to the kidney stone setting, one confounding variable which could explain this Simpson's reversal is the decision of the prospective student on whether to apply to University X, which likely depends on their interests and their self-assessment of the likelihood of admission. In practice, this may need to be determined via background knowledge or further analysis.
Case Study of Differential Fairness
To illustrate the practical application of differential fairness, we performed a case study on 1994 U.S. census income data, using the Adult dataset from the UCI repository [25] . The dataset consists of 14 attributes regarding work, relationships, and demographics for individuals, who are labeled according to whether their income exceeds a threshold of $50, 000. The data is pre-split into a training set of 32,561 instances and a test set of 16,281 instances. For our fairness analysis, we select race, gender, and nationality as the protected attributes. As most instances have U.S. nationality, we treat nationality as binary between U.S. and "other." Gender is coded as binary. The race attribute has 5 values, however we merged the Native American category with the "other" category for the fairness analysis, as both contained very few instances. In Table 2 , we report for empirical differential fairness, via Equation 6 , for each subset of the protected attributes, on the Table 3 : Differential fairness of logistic regression (Adult dataset, protected attributes were gender, race, nationality). Dirichlet smoothing was used, as in Equation 7 , with α = 1. The test dataset was = 2.06-DF.
training set. Our analysis finds that the inequity, as measured by -EDF, is less for nationality than for race or gender. The inequity at the intersection of race and gender is substantially higher than that of either attribute alone ( = 1.76, versus 0.93 and 1.03), while this gap is smaller for the other two-attribute intersections. We also calculated differential fairness for a logistic regression model, using all 3 protected attributes to calculate on the test set (Table 3) . We evaluated the impact of a manual feature selection pre-processing step of withholding these attributes from the classifier, on both accuracy and fairness. Interestingly, the test error was lowest when the classifier used none of the sensitive attributes, while also obtaining the near-lowest . In particular, allowing the classifier to use race as a feature increased both the error rates and the unfairness . One explanation is that including race introduces feature redundancies, and the consequent overfitting causes both the accuracy and fairness issues. While we were here able to simultaneously improve fairness and accuracy, this may not always be the case [4] . In that scenario, a compromise must be determined by the analyst, weighing against accuracy.
We further report the difference in values between the fairness of the algorithm and the fairness in the data, empirically calculated on the test set ( = 2.06-DF), in the third column of Table 3 . This is a measure of the extent to which the learning algorithm magnifies the bias present in the original data, a phenomenon known as bias amplification [38] . In most cases, the bias of the data was increased by the learning algorithm. Interestingly, when the classifier was given the nationality attribute, the bias was slightly less than that of the original training data. We hypothesize that this is once again due to overfitting, but in this case the classifier learned a kind of "reverse discrimination," in the opposite direction to the other biases.
Related Work
This section discusses relationships with other concepts in fairness, privacy, and in the treatment of subsets of protected groups.
Fairness Definitions
An overview of fairness research can be found in [4] . We briefly describe several of the most influential mathematical definitions of fairness below, and discuss their relationships to our proposed criterion, differential fairness.
Demographic Parity: Dwork et al. [15] defined (and criticized) the fairness notion of demographic parity, a.k.a. statistical parity, which requires that P(y|s i ) = P(y|s j ) for any outcome y and pairs of protected attribute values s i , s j (here assumed to be a single attribute). This can be relaxed, e.g. by requiring the total variation distance between the distributions to be less than . Differential fairness is closely related as it also aims to match probabilities of outcomes, but measures differences using ratios, and allows for multiple protected attributes. The criticisms of [15] are mainly related to ways in which subgroups of the protected groups can be treated differently while maintaining demographic parity, which they call "subset targeting," and which [23] term "fairness gerrymandering." Differential fairness explicitly protects the intersection of multiple protected attributes, which can be used to mitigate some of these abuses.
Equalized Odds: To address some of the limitations with demographic parity, Hardt et al. [18] propose to instead ensure that a classifier has equal error rates for each protected group. This fairness definition, called equalized odds, can loosely be understood as a notion of "demographic parity for error rates instead of outcomes." Unlike demographic parity, equalized odds rewards accurate classification, and penalizes systems only performing well on the majority group. However, theoretical work has shown that equalized odds is typically incompatible with correctly calibrated probability estimates [31] . It is also a relatively weak notion of fairness from a civil rights perspective compared to demographic parity, as it does not ensure that outcomes are distributed equitably. Hardt et al. also propose a variant definition called equality of opportunity, which relaxes equalized odds to only apply to a deserving outcome. It is straightforward to extend differential fairness to a definition analogous to equalized odds while porting an analogous privacy guarantee of Equation 4, although we leave the exploration of this for future work.
Subgroup Fairness and Multicalibration: Kearns et al. [23] provide fairness definitions which address the targeting of certain classes of subgroups of a protected group (subset targeting, or fairness gerrymandering). Their statistical parity subgroup fairness and false positive subgroup fairness definitions are analogous to statistical parity and equalized odds, respectively, but they ensure that each of a specified collection of subgroups simultaneously satisfies the analogous definition, unless that subgroup is a very small fraction of the population. Contemporaneously publishing with [23] at ICML 2018, Hébert-Johnson et al. [19] introduced multicalibration, a similar fairness definition to subgroup fairness, but for calibration.
Individual Fairness ("Fairness Through Awareness"): The individual fairness definition, due to Dwork et al. [15] , mathematically enforces the principle that similar individuals should get similar outcomes under a classification algorithm. An advantage of this approach is that it preserves the privacy of the individuals, which can be important when the user of the classifications (the vendor), e.g. a banking corporation, cannot be trusted to act in a fair manner. However, this is difficult to implement in practice as one must define "similar" in a fair way. The individual fairness property also does not necessarily generalize beyond training set. In this work, we take inspiration from Dwork et al.'s untrusted vendor scenario, and the use of a privacy-preserving fairness definition to address it.
Counterfactual Fairness: Kusner et al. [26] propose a causal definition of fairness. Under their counterfactual fairness definition, changing protected attributes A, while holding things which are not causally dependent on A constant, will not change the predicted distribution of outcomes. While theoretically appealing, there are difficulties in implementing this in practice. First, it requires an accurate causal model at the fine-grained individual level, while even obtaining a correct population-level causal model is generally very difficult. To implement it, we must solve a challenging causal inference problem over unobserved variables, which generally requires approximate inference algorithms such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods [12] . Finally, to achieve counterfactual fairness, the predictions (usually) cannot make direct use of any descendant of A in the causal model. This generally precludes using any of the observed features as inputs to the classifier.
Threshold Tests: [32] address infra-marginality by modeling risk probabilities for different subsets (i.e. attribute values) within each protected category, and requiring algorithms to threshold these probabilities at the same points when determining outcomes. In contrast, based on intersectionality theory, our proposed differential fairness criterion specifies protected categories whose intersecting subsets should be treated equally, regardless of differences in risk across the subsets. Our definition is appropriate when the differences in risk are due to structural systems of oppression, i.e. the risk probabilities themselves are impacted by an unfair process.
Privacy Definitions
Differential Privacy: Our work on fairness is inspired by differential privacy, the gold-standard notion of privacy for data-driven algorithms [16, 17] . Essentially, differential privacy is a promise: if an individual contributes their data to a dataset, their resulting utility, due to algorithms applied to that dataset, will not be substantially affected. The privacy guarantee is obtained via the use of randomized algorithms, typically by adding sufficient noise, e.g. from the Laplace distribution, in order to obfuscate the impact of any one data point on the algorithms' outputs. Definition 7.1. M(x) is -differentially private if P(M(x) ∈ S) P(M(x ) ∈ S) ≤ e for all outcomes S, and pairs of databases x, x differing in a single element.
Similarly to differential privacy, our proposed differential fairness definition bounds ratios of probabilities of outcomes resulting from a mechanism. However, there are several important differences. When bounding these ratios, differential fairness considers different values of a set of protected attributes, rather than databases that differ in a single element. It posits a specified set of possible distributions which may generate the data, while differential privacy implicitly assumes that the data are independent [24] . Finally, since differential fairness considers randomness in data as well as in the mechanism, it can be satisfied with a deterministic mechanism, while differential privacy can only be satisfied with a randomized mechanism.
Pufferfish: Kifer and Machanavajjhala [24] generalized differential privacy by using a variation of Equation 1 to hide the values of an arbitrary set of secrets.
Definition 7.2.
A mechanism M(x) is -pufferfish private in a framework (S, Q, Θ) if for all θ ∈ Θ with x ∼ θ, for all secret pairs (s i , s j ) ∈ Q and y ∈ Range(M),
when s i and s j are such that P(s i |θ) > 0, P(s j |θ) > 0.
The differential privacy criterion corresponds to a special case of pufferfish where the secrets are each individual's data, the individuals' data points are assumed to be independent, and any datasets differing by one individual must be indistinguishable. Differential fairness adapts pufferfish to the task of defining algorithmic fairness, by selecting a set of protected attributes as the secrets, and ensuring that the values of these attributes are indistinguishable. Thus, differential fairness provides a closely related privacy guarantee to differential privacy.
Other Related Work
Fairness and Intersectionality: Of particular relevance to this work, fairness in an intersectional setting has been considered by [7] in a computer vision context, and by [23] and [19] , who aim to protect certain subgroups by preventing "fairness gerrymandering."
Fairness and Uncertainty: Bayesian modeling of fairness has been performed by [32] in the context of stop-and-frisk policing, and by [26] , who use Bayesian inference on a causal model. As an alternative to the Bayesian methodology, adversarial methods are another strategy for managing uncertainty in a fairness context, e.g. [5] apply this approach to the setting of ensuring fairness given a limited number of observations in which demographic information is available.
Conclusion
We proposed differential fairness, a mathematical measure of fairness based on intersectionality, and which is related to differential privacy. Our empirical results show how differential fairness can measure (un)fairness with multiple protected attributes in order to identify inequities in algorithms and data, and the effects of engineering choices such as feature selection. In future, we plan to develop learning algorithms which use our criterion as a regularizer to automatically balance the trade-off between fairness and accuracy, following [3] , and Bayesian models which estimate data distributions for differential fairness in a data-efficient manner.
